On 20 October 2026, the French Treasury published a joint response from French authorities to the European consultation on reviewing the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA). The AMF followed with its 21 October announcement. The 73-page response makes specific proposals on staking, decentralised finance and certification of non-custodial wallets.
For validators, Web3 projects and crypto-asset holders, the practical question is: should participating in proof-of-stake consensus, commercially offering yield to clients and building a wallet that lets users control their own keys be treated as the same type of activity?
These are consultation proposals, not newly adopted law. They do not automatically subject all validators to licensing, establish universal mandatory wallet certification or mean that DeFi protocols have already received official certification. Keeping that distinction clear is central to understanding this development.
What happened on 20–21 October 2026?
The European Commission held its MiCA review consultation from 20 May to 30 September 2026. The French Treasury, Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF), Banque de France and Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) submitted a common response.
The document addresses the boundary between crypto-asset services, traditional finance and DeFi, as well as stablecoins, the role of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the supervision of intermediaries.
The most directly relevant sections for non-custodial infrastructure are on pages 52–59 of the full submission: assessing effective decentralisation, intermediaries' responsibilities, technical certification, wallets, and staking and lending.
The existing MiCA framework remains in force. Article 140 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 requires the European Commission to report to Parliament and Council by 30 June 2027, together with a legislative proposal where appropriate. Neither the content nor the entry-into-force date of possible amendments has been settled.
Staking: consensus participation is not the same as commercial yield
The French submission explicitly recognises that staking spans different activities. At one end is technical participation in proof-of-stake consensus; at the other are yield-generating arrangements offered or facilitated for clients by regulated intermediaries.
In section 4.2, page 58, the authorities argue that the current treatment of staking arrangements offered or facilitated by regulated providers does not sufficiently address risks to users. They suggest clearer requirements concerning:
- Rewards: their source, calculation, fees and conditions.
- Slashing and potential loss: including validator underperformance or failure.
- Lock-up and unbonding periods: including the time required to regain access to assets.
- Custody and effective control: who controls the assets and private keys.
- Conflicts of interest and risk communication: avoiding the misleading impression that network rewards are equivalent to protected bank savings.
These are proposed areas for more specific rules, not new requirements already imposed on every validator.
What the current regulatory guidance already says
ESMA Q&A 2067, based on a European Commission answer published in June 2024, states that staking narrowly understood as participating in blockchain consensus is not, in itself, subject to a specific MiCA authorisation or licensing requirement.
It distinguishes that activity from staking-as-a-service in which an intermediary holds clients' crypto-assets or private keys. Custody and administration of clients' crypto-assets are regulated under MiCA, and an intermediary providing those services must comply with the applicable rules.
The October 2026 French submission proposes confirming and clarifying this approach. It does not mean every service labelled “non-custodial” is automatically outside all regulation: the contractual service, access to keys, control over assets and any additional regulated activity require individual assessment.
Does a non-custodial validator operator automatically become a CASP?
No: operating technical consensus infrastructure, by itself, does not establish that the operator is providing a regulated crypto-asset service. Conversely, not directly holding user funds does not, by itself, settle the status of a commercial arrangement.
Three roles should be analysed separately:
- The asset holder, who retains control over assets and chooses whether to delegate.
- The technical operator, who maintains validator availability, monitoring, upgrades and operational performance.
- A potential commercial intermediary, which may pool deposits, control keys, manage client assets, package a yield offering or take on contractual obligations to clients.
An organisation may perform one role or several. The answer depends on the activities actually carried out, not the product name.
Snow-Fall publicly presents non-custodial staking, validator and node hosting, and RPC infrastructure without taking custody of delegators' tokens. For such a technical offering, the proposed review reinforces the value of documenting who holds keys, who signs transactions, how validator rewards are produced and the precise limitations of the operator's role. It does not justify claiming that any particular service is licensed, exempt or certified without a separate legal assessment.
For the underlying technical distinction, see our non-custodial staking explainer.
DeFi: proportional protocol certification, not a universal licence
The French authorities call for a clearer test of whether a DeFi protocol is genuinely decentralised. In pages 52–57, they advocate examining effective control and accountability rather than relying on terminology.
Relevant indicators include administrative keys, powers to upgrade or pause smart contracts, concentration of voting authority, control of protocol revenue and identifiable people or organisations able to influence the service.
Open-source code, a large number of governance-token holders or the “DAO” label do not, on their own, establish genuine decentralisation.
Where regulated crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) give clients access to DeFi, the authorities propose due diligence, ongoing monitoring, risk disclosure and potentially intermediary liability for relevant failures. Assessment could cover known vulnerabilities, audits and incidents, governance, operational resilience, liquidity, oracles, bridges and other dependencies.
They also support proportional certification schemes for certain DeFi protocols and smart contracts. Their answer to question 65 considers an approach built around public standards, qualified private-sector certifiers and assessments at the code-base level, rather than requiring public authorities to perform every technical certification themselves.
An important qualification: although the document explores certification for significant protocols, it also states that CASPs should not necessarily be prohibited from connecting clients to uncertified protocols, provided they carry out due diligence and enhanced disclosure. Accordingly, it would be misleading to claim that “every DeFi smart contract will soon require certification.”
Non-custodial wallets: France does not support blanket mandatory certification
One of the clearest positions appears on page 56, question 64.
The French authorities consider that requiring every non-custodial wallet developer to obtain certification would be disproportionate at this stage. A software or hardware wallet is a technical tool that may serve numerous purposes, and universal certification would be difficult to enforce.
Instead, they advocate incentivising voluntary certification, especially for wallets with advanced functions, integrated access to DeFi or crypto services, or retail distribution.
Proportionality extends to the process: the following page proposes a lightweight, code-based approach. This remains a policy suggestion, not a generally available mandatory badge or a claim that any particular wallet is officially approved.
For users, more immediate technical controls remain essential: secure secret generation and backup, key isolation, transaction display integrity, trusted updates, transaction-authorisation boundaries and recovery procedures.
These themes align with GLOV Secure, custody architecture and our non-custodial governance analysis. GLOV does not claim to issue regulatory wallet certifications.
Lending and borrowing: a separate risk category
Section 4.2 also proposes specific requirements for CASPs offering or facilitating crypto-asset lending and borrowing, proportionate to their level of activity.
Key risk factors include potential losses, reward transparency, collateral management, rehypothecation, conflicts of interest and the handling of client assets. The authorities discuss greater oversight without necessarily establishing a separate authorisation for lending as a standalone activity.
Such credit arrangements should not be confused with native blockchain staking. The economic rights and risks differ even where consumer-facing interfaces group both under the term “yield”.
How businesses can prepare without treating proposals as law
The responsible approach is not to redesign a product today around a requirement that may never be adopted. It is to document how the service actually functions.
Five questions offer a useful starting point:
- Who controls assets and keys? Map signing rights, custody relationships, multisignature arrangements and recovery procedures.
- Where do rewards originate, and who bears the risk? Explain fees, slashing, validator performance, unbonding, potential losses and delegation mechanics.
- Who can change the rules? Document admin keys, pause and upgrade powers, governance concentration and smart-contract privileged roles.
- How are third parties assessed? Keep records of audits, known limitations, dependencies on oracles, bridges, hosting and service providers.
- What are clients actually told? Distinguish consensus rewards from guaranteed savings, disclose limitations and avoid misleading comparisons.
For GLOV Consulting, these are questions of risk mapping, governance, dependencies and decision-making. For Snow-Fall, they reinforce the boundary between technical infrastructure operation and asset control. For GLOV Secure, they connect with custody design, authorisation and continuity.
These are practical preparation principles, not a declaration of MiCA compliance or individual legal advice.
What remains uncertain as of 25 October 2026?
No final legislative amendment follows automatically from the French submission. Open questions include the scope of any DeFi certification scheme, proportionality thresholds, intermediary obligations, oversight arrangements and the implementation timetable.
European institutions may also have different priorities. In its 30 September 2026 response, ESMA separately advocated proportionate requirements for staking, lending and borrowing and clearer criteria for DeFi access. That does not establish agreement on any future legislative text.
The central distinction is not between “centralised crypto” and “decentralised crypto” as labels. It is the real allocation of control, access to client assets and responsibility towards users.
GLOV Solutions editorial analysis — information reviewed as of 25 October 2026. Educational content, not legal or financial advice.
Official sources and further reading
- French Treasury — official overview, 20 October 2026
- French authorities — full 73-page MiCA consultation response, sections 4.1–4.2, pages 52–59
- AMF — joint press release, 21 October 2026
- European Commission — MiCA consultation, 20 May to 30 September 2026
- ESMA — Q&A 2067 on staking services under MiCA
- ESMA — MiCA review recommendations, 30 September 2026
- Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 — MiCA, Article 140